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abStract
Some policies that manage natural processes have the purpose of conserving and/or promot-
ing the diversity that exists in an ecosystem. On many occasions, these policies conflict with 
values such as individual wellbeing. This paper looks at this issue. It focuses first on clarify-
ing the concept of diversity. Second, it looks at whether diversity has value, and what kind of 
value it may have. Finally, it argues that although diversity is valuable, it may be overridden 
in cases in which actual harms exceed future benefits. Therefore, policies that promote diver-
sity should, in some cases, be abandoned.
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1. introduction: thE harm thEy inflict
There are a great number of policies that manage natural processes. An 
example would be planning to conserve a natural area for the next ten 
years. In most cases, these policies require intervention in nature in one 
way or another, although in a few cases they do not. The reasons/ends that 
motivate the policies that manage natural processes vary. A great number 
of these policies have environmental aims. This means that their final aim 
is the conservation of ecosystems in an optimal functioning state, but they 
can also aim to conserve an ecosystem according to its original state. 
When defining strategic management goals, one of the common aims 
that drive many interventions in nature is the promotion of diversity. 
Promoting diversity can involve a recommendation either to intervene 
in nature, or not to intervene. The management of invasive species is an 
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example of when promoting diversity requires intervening in nature. Inva-
sive species occupy a territory that did not previously belong to them, and 
they become the new possessors of it. If the invasive species is a plant, this 
plant will be the new occupant of the natural territory, displacing the old 
occupants until they become extinct in the area. If the invasion is made by 
an animal species that happens to feed on a particular plants, the extinc-
tion of the plant will occur as a consequence of the feeding habits of the 
new inhabitants. The policy normally adopted here would be to restore 
the previous distribution of species, either by replacing the invasive plants 
with the original ones, or by eliminating the presence of the new animals. 
However, while restoring a plant species over other species of plants does 
not seem to involve any direct harm on the individuals who inhabit the 
ecosystem, restoring a plant species at cost to other species of animals, or 
restoring a species of animals over other species of animals, does. 
In other cases, what promoting diversity will require us to do is to 
refrain from intervening in nature because the consequences of a possible 
intervention would reduce diversity. There are processes in nature that 
involve suffering at least, and harm, death and misery, at most. The natural 
processes that affect animals in the wild are often of the latter kind. Most 
animals that live in the wild die of thirst and starvation. Natural disasters 
lead to their suffering from diseases or physical injury. A significant number 
suffer and die from parasitism, and others die as the victims of a predator, 
suffering a great amount of distress during their – normally short – lives. 
As consequence, the disvalue to which their lives amount seems to out-
weigh the positive value. Should not we intervene in such cases to alleviate 
the suffering of animals? Recent discussions in the field of intervention in 
nature give compelling reasons to support such interventions under the 
premise that animals are not “there in the wild” as other parts of natural 
systems are, like for example trees or rivers. Animals, as other sentient 
beings, have moral status and therefore their interests need to be con-
sidered when designing the management of natural processes. However, 
one of the difficult questions that arises after deciding that intervention 
is required is how we ought to intervene in such cases. What is the best 
policy of intervention to adopt in view of the bad consequences for non-
human animals that these natural processes involve? Feeding and treating 
animals with diseases are easy policies to implement. Some authors have 
also suggested patterns of intervention that would alleviate the suffering of 
prey, for example. For this, they have proposed the controlled extinction 
of some predators (Pearce 2009). A common objection to this would be 
to say that a policy like this would diminish the number of species in our 
ecosystem and therefore also the amount of diversity in the world.
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Far from the case of animals that suffer in nature, other cases can be 
found in which promoting diversity requires refraining from intervening 
in order to alleviate a certain sort of suffering. The natural endowment an 
individual is born with is the consequence of a natural process. The genetic 
material from which a fetus is formed depends mostly on the genetics of the 
biological progenitors, and even when mutations in genes happen, there is 
a huge component of heritability in them. Genetically inherited disabilities 
and illnesses are the result of these natural processes of genetic combina-
tions that end up bringing new individuals into the world with conditions 
that to some extent will compromise their wellbeing  1. Some have argued 
that we should oppose intervention in these genetic processes on the 
grounds that it would in the end reduce the diversity of people existing in 
the world, affirming that it would be bad if people with Down syndrome, 
for example, no longer existed. Nevertheless, rejecting intervention to pre-
vent these cases presumably brings into the world a state of affairs that 
involves the existence of unnecessary extra suffering. 
The previous two cases have various things in common. The killing of 
massive numbers of individuals – normally members of an invasive spe-
cies – is justified by referring to the modification of the previous state of 
natural diversity that they have disturbed. Extinguishing some predators – 
by stopping them from reproducing and without causing any extra harm 
to individuals – is commonly rejected due to the loss of species diversity it 
would imply. The rejection of intervention to ensure that people are born 
without disabilities is also frequently grounded in pro-diversity claims, i.e. 
the variety of people in the world would diminish if all were born with the 
same capabilities. 
The purpose of this paper is not to defend the claim that the diversity 
of types of plants, non-human animals or humans has no value whatso-
ever. Instead, I will accept that diversity has value, but will try to show 
that the value of diversity can never outweigh the disvalue of promoting or 
protecting diversity when these cases involve harm, suffering and pain for 
individuals that could be avoided at a not very high cost. In the following 
sections I will focus on what diversity is and what its value in nature may 
be. Then, I will look at whether we should intervene in nature in favor 
of diversity. Finally, I will offer some conclusions for the future improve-
ment of our policies of intervention regarding both nature and non-human 
sentient individuals. 
 1 I will leave aside here the question of whether this example really constitutes a case 
of harm, and the identity problems that harming individuals who do not exist and who 
might, if intervened with, never come into being, convey (see Parfit [1984] 1986).
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2. what iS divErSity and what iS itS valuE? 
Diversity is a relational property. This is because a single object does not 
offer any feature that differs from this object’s own features (if we accept 
the identity principle, an object is always equal to itself insofar as the prop-
erties of an object can never differ from themselves). In other words, for an 
individual, X, there cannot exist two descriptions of the same property 
that are compatible. For example “Sarah Lopez is 1.2 meters tall and Sarah 
Lopez is 1.5 meters tall” is an incoherent statement as it is metaphysically 
impossible that Sarah Lopez has two different heights at a single point in 
time. Diversity, therefore, can only exist in sets, or groups, of objects. If the 
set in question contains at least two objects among which the relation of 
“not being equal to the rest of the objects of the set” holds – a priori, every 
time that we have a set with more than one element – then we can say that 
the set has the property of being diverse. Yet even though diversity is a 
property that can be predicated from a huge variety of sets, for the purpose 
of this article the evaluation of the role of diversity will be restricted to sets 
composed of sentient individuals. 
Strictly speaking, diversity needs to be differentiated from numerical 
plurality or multiplicity. Plurality as a property that also applies to sets 
would mean “a plural number of things”. Numerical plurality just means 
a number greater than one. Multiplicity or plurality are logically prior to 
diversity and therefore a necessary condition for it, but never sufficient, 
unless the things that are multiple in number are property-types. Thus, 
diversity is a property that expresses whether the members of a set differ 
or not – and how much they do so – in a particular way. For example, we 
could have a plural number of wolves, without that implying diversity in 
any relevant sense, such as, for example, species diversity.
However, what do we mean when we utter propositions such as “soci-
ety X is diverse”? Such a proposition is not very informative on the value 
of diversity. Thus, the relevant question would be: what should be meant 
by sentences of this type? Following common use of the word “diversity”, 
this word seems to be a thick evaluative concept already loaded with posi-
tive moral connotations. One of the reasons why we tend to apply positive 
connotations to diversity might be its frequent appearance in many relevant 
official documents, or in support of the human rights discourse. The 2001 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity states in its first 
article that “as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural 
diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this 
sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized 
and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations” (2002, 4). 
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Diversity seems typically a good value to promote, but there is nothing 
necessarily good about diversity along some dimensions. The justification 
of the relevance of diversity that this document implies does not seem to 
commit to the defense of the intrinsic value of diversity. On the contrary, 
it recognizes its extrinsic value. The relevance of the good consequences 
is clearly manifested next in the text. Finally, article 3 clearly states that 
cultural diversity is a crucial factor for development, as it widens the range 
of options to everyone, not only in economic terms, but also intellectual, 
affective, moral and spiritual. So even when the declaration does not use 
the term as a thick evaluative concept at all, but just as a value that is good, 
the relevance of the documents in which “diversity” is used, and the fre-
quency with which it appears, seem to put the world in a morally privileged 
state.
A paradigmatic case of the concept of diversity being loaded with eval-
uative meaning is the use of the concept “functional diversity”. Within the 
disability literature, the expression “functional diversity” has commenced 
to substitute “disability” to describe the state that characterizes a person 
with a disability. By substituting “disabled body” by “body with diverse 
functioning” they make sure that disabled people become just part of the 
majority. Actually they become part of the total set of individuals, because 
everyone has, by default, bodily functioning that is different from that of 
their fellows; either everybody is a person with a “diversely-functioning 
body”, or nobody is. Thus, this inclusive term loses in explanatory power. 
It is difficult to disagree with the fact that there are many paradigmatic 
cases in which diversity seems to be a prima facie good value to promote. 
Diversity of cultures in the world would be one of them. Cultural diversity 
is of instrumental value as it is a launch pad for obtaining other good vales 
such as peace, tolerance or wider knowledge, as stated in the Universal Dec-
laration on Cultural Diversity. However, the property “diversity” seems to 
be only an extensional way of referring to the set of individuals under con-
sideration. It refers to the grade of variability in the typology or characteris-
tics of the elements under consideration that we can find in a concrete set. 
The previous description does not provide any further information about 
the morally relevant characteristics of the individuals under consideration 
that count when it comes to deciding the properties that living individuals 
should have, because it focuses on a relational description. Equality is also 
a relational concept and, as is the case with diversity, only the equality of 
certain things matters. Thus, not all differences are good, and in some cases 
such as “diversity of health” or “diversity of income” there seems not to be 
any good aspect in such a distribution. Thus, as a potential value, not all 
the ways in which a set can be diverse are morally relevant. 
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A particular population – a set of sentient individuals – might have a 
huge variety in types of haircuts without that being any relevant character-
istic of the moral value of that population, or of the people’s lives within it. 
The same could be said about a population with considerable ideological 
diversity. Let us see why. When we see many differences in a society we 
may have reasons to suspect it is particularly tolerant, but that might not 
be necessarily the case. Diversyland is a society in which most of its citi-
zens have different opinions. Some would argue that this feature gives the 
society a great amount of value, due to the fact that every opinion or belief 
contains value in itself and therefore they are incommensurables. Still, most 
of the opinions of the inhabitants of Diversyland are stupid, morally bad 
and wrong. In this society everybody seems to make very innovative claims. 
There is considerable difference among these people’s opinions, which pro-
vides a huge range of available views about the world. Nevertheless, among 
this tremendous diversity of opinion and this rich culture, the citizens of 
Diversyland also seem to be quite ludicrous and often fail in terms of right-
ness. Every person seems to give original hypotheses about the functioning 
of things: morality, the world, the universe, etc., but the fact that almost 
all the opinions of this society differ from all the others does not guarantee 
the quality of any of them, and therefore other important values such as 
rightness or wellbeing might end up being affected by this diversity which, 
in the end, seems rather more like disparity. 
The same reasoning might follow for many other examples. The reason 
why schools apply a diversity policy might be different from a commitment 
to integration and equality. Hopefully this will not be common, but it might 
be the case that these policies represent an interest in capturing a larger 
number of students. Nevertheless, even if this were the case, the fact that 
there were students from different countries, with different religions and 
different abilities, would be something to value for its presumably good 
consequences. Hence, what is the nature of the value of diversity?
Ultimately, it seems that there is nothing particularly good about 
diversity of many things. Wellbeing is a good example of this. A diverse 
distribution of wellbeing – i.e. wellbeing distributed in different quantities 
among the individuals of a group – seems not to be something to value at 
all. I have not denied that diversity could have extrinsic value and that its 
value could give us reasons to act in favor of it. What reasons are there for 
the case of intervention in nature?
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3. Should wE intErvEnE in favor of divErSity?
 a normativE aSSESSmEnt of divErSity
Going back to the policies that intervene in nature with the aim of promot-
ing natural diversity, what these policies imply by their interventions is that 
the value of diversity is either (I) intrinsic, because they value diversity in 
itself, or (II) dependent on other values. From what we have seen, it seems 
that diversity does have some value. If the value of diversity is dependent 
on the promotion of other values, these policies would seem to be address-
ing one of the following value judgements:
To lose environmental diversity is bad because the diversity of the world […].
 I. […] represents the traditional or historical natural order.
  This view represents a sort of general conservatism – namely natural 
conservatism – that may be motivated by different moral or theologi-
cal reasons. Under this view, traditional or historical orders are valuable 
and need to be conserved.
 II. […] is a natural order.
  This view, though similar to (i), is motivated by the assumption that 
what has intrinsic value is natural environments. Environmentalism 
would be an example of this view.
 III. […] has aesthetic value.
  Under this view, environmental diversity has aesthetic value. Like a 
famous picture which is kept in a museum for its conservation, environ-
mental diversity needs to be preserved as well.
 IV. […] helps to maintain ecosystems in good functioning.
  Under this view, an ecosystem that functions optimally is what possesses 
value. Some environmental policies assume this justification. 
Now, for (III) to be a coherent position of value-adscription it would seem 
reasonable that its advocates would aim not only to preserve diversity, but 
also to promote diversity whenever this was an available option that did not 
conflict with stronger values. Why is it better that the already existing diver-
sity be preserved rather than a greater amount of diversity being artificially 
created? The latter would not seem to be a popular policy. However, if 
intervening to prevent the existence of disabilities to avoid future suffering 
is bad due to the loss of human diversity that it implies, why not promote 
research to create lab-made new types of individuals? If we are prepared to 
kill thousands of individuals be cause they would make a particular type of 
plant in the area, why are not laboratories full of scientists designing new 
types of trees or flowers?
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However, there is a case in which the justification for the loss of 
diversity being bad seems reasonable. Option (IV) seems to deserve some 
credibility as a justification of the interventions that promote diversity in 
nature. Diversity is good for individuals as it helps to maintain systems and 
ecosystems in their correct functioning  2. A way of talking about the perils 
that the disappearance of diversity implies is by referring to the systemic 
risk of an ecosystem or ecosystem collapse (MacDougall et al. 2013). This 
common term issued in biology refers to the fragmentation of habitats due 
to the lost of equilibrium among different species’ vital functions. If scien-
tists are right about their predictions, the collapse of an ecosystem would 
imply the future progressive suffering of sentient beings by the pauperiza-
tion of the living conditions that would hold in it.
I have shown how intervention in nature must be guided by the protec-
tion of all individuals’ basic interests and how the promotion of diversity 
most commonly frustrates the interests of the vast majority of them, such 
as for example the interest in having a flourishing life or staying alive. Nev-
ertheless, biodiversity seems to be a clear case in which the promotion of 
diversity is valuable because it in turn promotes the wellbeing of all the sen-
tient members of an ecosystem. If the previous biological prediction is true, 
the morally relevant consequences here of environmental change and loss 
of diversity would include, among others, the future suffering of sentient 
individuals. Hence, the pertinent question that we should ask is: can future 
wellbeing ever justify present suffering? If the answer is yes, the policies we 
have been criticizing might in some cases have a possible justification.
The conflict between the aims of ecology and the interests of non-
human animals that live in the wild has been extensively highlighted 
(Horta 2010; Faria 2013). The problems caused to some animals by the 
implementation of the environmental policy of reintroducing wolves in a 
particular area in which they had previously disappeared (Horta 2010) is 
just an example. Intervening in nature to promote diversity by introducing 
new predators, or by killing thousands of members of a species, conflicts 
with the basic interests of many animals, such as the interest in staying 
alive, or the interest in having a flourishing live. Moreover, this violates a 
sort of equality that matters, namely the equal consideration for all sentient 
beings. Having said that, allowing harm to be inflicted on individuals is not 
 2 The mere maintenance of ecosystems in functioning does not seem to be valuable. 
The existence of ecosystems that function badly would probably allow a significant degree 
of harm for the individuals who inhabit it. Moreover, it is not completely clear whether 
the painless disappearance of ecosystems would constitute a loss of value. Believing so 
would imply the assumption that entities as ecosystems possess intrinsic value.
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always wrong. We concede a certain amount of suffering to be justifiable 
in some cases, namely those in which this implies a benefit that exceeds 
the harmful consequences of the intervention. It might be the case that the 
policies of intervention in nature that promote diversity can save animals 
from a greater disvalue in the future, and therefore be morally compelling. 
A “keystone species” is the one identified by biologists as a species 
whose removal is expected to result in the disappearance of at least half 
of the assemblage considered (Mills et al. 1993, 222). These species have a 
huge impact in the environment they live in. Applied to the cases of non-
human animals, it would seem that some animals are more relevant for 
ecosystems than others. A common case that illustrates this is bees. Bees 
perform a crucial role as pollinators and thus their disappearance poses a 
real threat for the environment, as it would also imply the disappearance 
of many species of plants and trees whose only means of reproduction is 
pollination. As the number of pollinators is decreasing nowadays, some 
countries have decided to import them from other places. This is itself 
potentially problematic as it might cause a territorial conflict between old 
and new colonies, if the imported animals are bees, for example.
One of the main moral problems derived from the use of the concept 
of “keystone species” is that very often keystone species are identified 
with predators. The reduction in numbers of some species of predators 
provokes an increase in other predators, or in consumers and competitors 
that, subsequently, extirpate several prey or competitor species. Thus, it 
seems that the good functioning of an ecosystem already assumes preda-
tion – and therefore suffering – as a necessary part of itself, which, trans-
lated into moral terms, means the suffering, agony and the early death of 
thousands of non-human animals. Ultimately, the problem has to do with 
what we consider that ecosystems should be and what their correct func-
tioning should be. Caring about the conservation of ecosystems at any cost 
should not be the aim of any policy of intervention in nature. Intervention 
should consider a new variable for making calculations, namely that of the 
suffering of non-human animals, to decide when a policy is worth being 
undertaken.
4. whEn valuES conflict: thE SuprEmacy
 of individualS’ prESEnt wEllbEing
I have shown so far how diversity quite often has an important instrumen-
tal value and how there is not necessarily anything good about diversity as 
an end. I have mentioned some examples. It does not seem plausible to 
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affirm that the value of diversity comes from its intrinsic properties. On the 
contrary, there are some contexts in which a diverse distribution seems not 
to be desirable independently of its consequences. 
This article concedes the moderate claim that diversity seems to be 
normatively relevant on some occasions. Diversity does provide reasons 
for action in some cases. Nevertheless, it is also committed to the claim 
that some values matter more than others. Hence, when the promotion of 
diversity conflicts with other values such as individual wellbeing, diversity 
policies should be more carefully considered. The reason invoked here 
is that the promotion of the diversity of animal species, plants diversity, 
biodiversity in general, or even diversity of intellectual capabilities, is not 
normally morally required because such promotions of diversity conflict 
with other values that provide stronger reasons to act.
Allowing and/or promoting the existence of great differences among 
individuals in relation to their intellectual capacities – and therefore a great 
diversity – would be instrumentally good. Surely, the knowledge we obtain 
from the mere existence of people with disabilities, their minds, bodies and 
behavior functioning in different ways, is valuable in different areas: medi-
cine, science, politics, philosophy of mind, personal affection, and probably 
many others. This is something beneficial for our society, as it makes it more 
knowledgeable and rich in general terms. We could even agree with the fact 
that the existence of people with lower intellectual abilities makes us appre-
ciate our higher complex intellectual functioning. Are these strong enough 
reasons to reject the practices that avoid people with disabilities being born? 
Preventing the existence of some types of individuals might create a 
disvalue in the amount of knowledge that exists in the world, but it might 
in return benefit us with a decrease in the levels of inequality and suffering, 
and presumably also harm if we consider the case of predators. Further-
more, if the knowledge argument is coherent, why should not we increase 
the variety of capabilities and endowments in a laboratory, as the more 
types of distribution we have the greater the amount of knowledge a society 
would benefit from? However, the price to pay for this knowledge is too 
high, and permitting great differences in the natural distribution of endow-
ments for the sake of knowledge seems perverse. 
If the benefit adduced with the promotion of diversity has to do with 
preventing the clash of ecosystems, intervening in nature in the name of 
diversity seems compelling. Diversity in species of plants and non-human 
animals would only be a means for a greater long-term benefit that is actu-
ally related to individuals’ wellbeing. The equilibrium of ecosystems is 
important to secure conditions of habitability in this planet, and is there-
fore something that needs to be preserved. 
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The objection against rejecting interventions in nature in the name of 
diversity would not affect our first case of diversity in the distribution of 
natural endowments, however. Following the definition of keystone spe-
cies, the disappearance of some types of human beings – namely those who 
are born with severe disabilities – would not seem to pose a threat to the 
environment they live in, in biological terms. For that to be the case, more 
than fifty per cent of the diversity of the environment they live in would 
have to disappear (Mills et al. 1993), and that does not seem to be the case 
for their ceasing to come into existence. Even more importantly, individu-
als with disabilities are not a species as such, but a type of individual that 
belongs to the species of human beings. The objection to intervening in 
nature in the name of diversity would nevertheless affect the case of biodi-
versity in ecosystems. Still, an argument against present policies of natural 
management of nature in favor of diversity can be made. 
The argument against present policies of intervention in nature that 
favor diversity can be made by noting that considerations about long-run 
future harms have to be weighed against the current harm being inflicted 
on millions of currently existing sentient individuals. The good function-
ing of an ecosystem through the promotion of biodiversity would prevent 
the possible future suffering of non-human and human animals by avoid-
ing the consequences of an ecosystem collapse. However, the prevention 
of future suffering by avoiding the loss of diversity is normally performed in 
a way that already consists of a huge amount of suffering. Individuals that 
disrupt the diversity of a particular ecosystem must be exterminated, which 
involves millions of deaths and suffering. Moreover, ecosystem conserva-
tion assumes within its premises the function of predation as indispensable, 
which also results in the current suffering and deaths of millions of indi-
viduals as victims of predation.
Ultimately, more scientific research is needed in order to be able to 
quantify the loss and the speed at which the degeneration of an ecosystem 
would be produced due to the loss of diversity. Future environmental and 
biological research might show that the harming interventions – which 
translate into a huge amount of suffering for sentient individuals – that 
this paper has been discussing, might not be worthwhile in the end. Only 
the possibility of avoiding catastrophically bad consequences for sentient 
individuals in the future – greater than the ones already suffered by many 
non-human animals – could justify such policies. As it does not seem pos-
sible to guarantee this hypothesis at the moment, diversity policies such as 
the ones discussed in this paper should be abandoned.
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5. concluSion
I have concluded that diversity contributes to personal wellbeing. Never-
theless, diversity as a value can sometimes be overridden. The reason for 
this is that in some cases diversity promotes a great amount of actual cur-
rent suffering over an uncertain amount of future prevention of harm. 
This paper has shown that long-run benefits to individuals’ wellbeing 
need to be weighed against current suffering already being inflicted on 
individuals. Still, more scientific research is needed in order to weigh such 
harms and benefits. More specifically, more moral and biological research 
needs to be done on the issue of interspecies comparisons of wellbeing to 
find the best way of prioritizing some policies of intervention over others. 
A sentient-based approach to ecosystem functioning is also needed. A 
shift in the way correct ecosystem functioning is understood is crucial for 
this. This new approach needs to give up considering non-human animals 
as mere parts of the ecosystem they live in. Unlike plants, rivers or moun-
tains, non-human animals are sentient individuals, and therefore possess 
moral standing. 
A crucial challenge for a new sentient-based understanding of eco-
system functioning is the existence of predation. Predators are sentient 
individuals who are typically responsible for high levels of suffering that 
they inflict on other individuals, namely their prey. Optimally perfect 
ecosystems are always thought to contain the function of predation within 
the rest of functions that typically guarantee a well operating ecosystem. 
Some ways of avoiding predation have already been proposed. The painless 
extinction of predators could be one way of proceeding. Genetically repro-
gramming the instincts of predators so that they stop being hunters, but 
also their metabolisms so that they can survive with a meat-free diet, would 
be another possible way to proceed. Again, for this case, more research is 
needed in order to evaluate the feasibility of such policies.
Finally, a shift in how we generally understand intervention in nature is 
needed. Diversity loss may lead all sentient individuals to live in an impov-
erished future ecosystem. However, current problems such as parasitism, 
natural disasters, predation or illnesses already mean that a great number of 
individuals that live in the wild have to live very short and poor lives. If pre-
venting possible future suffering gives us reasons to intervene in nature, it 
seems obvious that a considerable amount of current suffering would mean 
that we are required to intervene in favor of the victims of such events.
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